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Abstract
Public ignorance is an inherent threat to democracy. It breeds superstition, prejudice, and error; and it
prevents both a clear-eyed understanding of the world and the formulation of wise policies to adapt to that
world.
Plato believed it was more than a threat: He thought it characterized democracies, and would lead them
inevitably into anarchy and ultimately tyranny. But the liberal democracies of the modern era, grudgingly
extending suffrage, have extended public education in parallel, in the hope of cultivating an informed citizenry.
Yet today, given the persistence and severity of public ignorance, the ideal of an enlightened electorate seems a
fading wish at best, a cruel folly at worst. (excerpt)
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 American Populism Shouldn’t Have to 
Embrace Ignorance 
Rejecting Authority and Expertise Doesn't Make All Opinions 
Equally Worthy 
 
Earth Day marchers in Melbourne, Australia. Photo courtesy of John Englart/Wikimedia Commons. 
By Daniel R. DeNicola | November 14, 2017  
Public ignorance is an inherent threat to democracy. It breeds superstition, prejudice, and error; 
and it prevents both a clear-eyed understanding of the world and the formulation of wise policies 
to adapt to that world.  
Plato believed it was more than a threat: He thought it characterized democracies, and would 
lead them inevitably into anarchy and ultimately tyranny. But the liberal democracies of the 
modern era, grudgingly extending suffrage, have extended public education in parallel, in the 
hope of cultivating an informed citizenry. Yet today, given the persistence and severity of public 
ignorance, the ideal of an enlightened electorate seems a fading wish at best, a cruel folly at 
worst.  
Unfortunately, our current civic problem cuts even deeper: We are witnessing the rise of a 
culture of ignorance. It is particularly insidious because it hijacks certain democratic values. To 
begin to understand this culture and its effects, it is helpful to identify the ways it differs from 
simple ignorance. 
Perhaps the most noticeable aspect of a culture of ignorance is the extent of willful ignorance. 
Ignorance that is willful may involve resistance to learning, denial of relevant facts, the ignoring 
of relevant evidence, and suppression of information. Such ignorance is usually maintained in 
order to protect a prior belief or value—a sense of self, an ideology, a religious doctrine, or some 
other cherished cognitive commitment. False knowledge often bolsters one’s will in maintaining 
a closed mind; but of course, it is only ignorance in elaborate disguise.  
When the willfully ignorant are cornered by mounting evidence, they assert their individual right 
to believe whatever they choose to believe. This is a hollow and silly claim. Beliefs are factive; 
they aspire to truth. Moreover, beliefs affect attitudes, decisions, and actions. As the Victorian 
mathematical philosopher William K. Clifford remarked, “No one man’s belief is in any case a 
private matter which concerns him alone.” He proposed “an ethic of belief” and championed our 
responsibility to respect evidence for and against our beliefs. Though his standard of evidence 
may have been too stringent, we can agree that claiming the right to believe “whatever” exploits 
the democratic respect for individual rights by foregoing individual responsibilities.  
A related characteristic is the rejection of expertise. Liberal democratic theory and practice have 
always elevated individual autonomy and independence, rejecting authority and dependency. 
They therefore have had difficulties with any relationship that yields individual autonomy—
which seems to be involved in consulting an expert. It is true that the place of expertise in a 
democracy remains contested: We may yield to the expertise of the physician, pilot, or engineer 
(albeit uneasily); but we may be skeptical of the expertise of the economist, climate scientist, or 
critic.  
 Are we heading toward a culture of ignorance? Photo courtesy of pxhere. 
Our ambivalence regarding expertise has increasingly come to be a rejection. The rise of social 
media has certainly contributed to this trend. Who needs a qualified film or restaurant critic when 
one can find websites that provide thousands of audience or diner ratings? But the implications 
go far beyond aesthetics: As a senior minister famously said during the recent Brexit campaign, 
“Britain has had enough of experts.” Among at least a significant portion of the population, this 
attitude has led to a rejection of the traditional sources and certifiers of knowledge—universities, 
science, established journalism. As this attitude engulfs public life, it undermines the fragile but 
vital distinction between knowledge and belief, between informed judgment and unreflective 
opinion.  
This epistemic populism seems radically democratic, but that image is an illusion. Democracy is, 
as John Dewey described, a moral climate in which each person may contribute to the 
construction of knowledge; but it doesn’t imply that each person possesses the truth. Moreover, 
one need not yield political authority to experts; it is epistemic authority—the authority of 
knowledge, skill, experience, and judgment—that is carried by experts.  
At some point, the “wisdom of crowds” becomes the celebration of ignorance. Conspiracy 
theories, wild speculations and accusations, nutty claims, “alternate facts,” and pronouncements 
that are far afield from one’s knowledge—all these claim time or space on a par with accurate 
and important information. The politician who is ignorant of politics, the law, and history is seen 
as the person who will “get things done.” Some public figures wear their ignorance as a badge of 
honor. Let’s be clear: Ignorance is not stupidity, though I admit it is sometimes difficult to tell 
them apart in practice. And stupidity is likely to produce ignorance across a broad front. But one 
can be ignorant without being stupid.  
Underlying all of these factors is the loss of respect for the truth. No doubt, many things have 
contributed: the venality of some experts, the public disagreement among experts, the continual 
revising of expert advice, and the often-unwarranted movement by social scientists from the 
descriptive to the normative, from facts to pronouncements. Religious fundamentalism, which 
stretches credibility, is another precipitating factor. The postmodernist deconstruction of ideals 
like truth, rationality, and objectivity, also contributed to this loss—though I doubt that 
postmodernist treatises were widely read among conspiracy theorists, religious fundamentalists, 
or climate change deniers.  
The irony is that these folks believe they are holding the truth. Indeed, I am not suggesting that 
we need to claim we possess the Truth, firmly and finally; in fact, I believe those who make that 
claim actually disrespect the truth. Rather, we need to keep the ideal of truth to guide our 
inquiries, to aspire to greater truth. Not all opinions or interpretations are equally worthy. The 
concept of truth is required to separate knowledge from opinion; those who give up on truth, 
those for whom truth doesn’t matter, are—as the contemporary philosopher Harry Frankfurt 
said—left with bullshit.  
There are signs of hope. Many young people have a naturally skeptical, even cynical, attitude 
regarding information sources. There is a surge of interest in investigative journalism in various 
forms. The teaching of critical thinking has broadened to include information literacy: Many 
colleges now provide ways to learn the skills of evaluating informational sources and content, 
including statistical integrity. Scholars are giving new attention to epistemic virtues, capacities 
and traits that enhance the acquisition of knowledge. There is excited talk among feminist and 
educational philosophers of “an epistemology and pedagogy of resistance” that confronts willful 
ignorance and the “epistemic injustice” of systematically discrediting certain voices.  
The danger, and by the same token, the hope lies in this truth: In the end, ignorance will lead to 
error. Serious mistakes and their consequences may be required before there is momentum 
sufficient to roll back this culture.  
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